The BEPS Multilateral Instrument - General overview and focus on treaty abuse

Prof. Dr. iur. Robert Danon & Salome Huges
CHF 89.75


1 Introduction  

2 General presentation of the MLI  


2.1 General overview of the tax treaty related measures  


2.2 Legal nature, scope and effect of the MLI  


2.3 Interpretation of the MLI  

2.3.1 Formal provisions  

2.3.2 Substantive provisions  

2.3.3 Resolution by mutual agreement  

2.3.4 Outcome  


2.4 Flexibility of the MLI  

2.4.1 In general  

2.4.2 Opt-in mechanisms  

2.4.3 Opt-out mechanisms  

2.4.4 Effect of choices made on CTAs: the ≪matching exercise≫  

2.4.5 Compatibility clauses  

2.4.6 Exercise and subsequent changes of available choices  


2.5 Entry into force/into effect and withdrawal  


2.6 Overview of positions taken by the signing jurisdictions


3 Treaty Abuse in the post MLI world  


3.1 The problem of treaty abuse  


3.2 Classification of fact typical patterns leading to treaty abuse  

3.2.1 Conduit situations – Treaty shopping Stepping stone and direct conduit structures Policy considerations  

3.2.2 Abusive restructurings Treaty shopping. Rule shopping Other abusive restructurings involving capital gains (art. 13 OECD MC) Policy considerations  


3.3 Review of selected treaty anti-avoidance rules of the pre-BEPS era 

3.3.1 Beneficial ownership In general Position of the OECD Commentary Impact on conduit and abusive restructuring cases Consequences in case of denial of treaty benefits  

3.3.2 General anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) In general Position of the OECD Commentary Compatibility of domestic anti-avoidance with treaty obligations The unwritten prohibition of abuse The guiding principle Impact on conduit and abusive restructuring cases Consequences in the case of denial of treaty benefits  

3.3.3 Relation between SAARs and GAARs  


3.4 The BEPS and MLI responses to treaty abuse  

3.4.1 Minimum standards Amendment to the preamble text Introduction of a PPT rule or LOB clause with anti-conduit mechanism  

3.4.2 Recommendations Dividend transfer transactions Capital gains from alienation of real estate entities Anti-abuse rule for low taxed PEs in triangular cases Savings clause  


3.5 Substantive analysis of the PPT rule  

3.5.1 Presentation and origin of the rule  

3.5.2 Material scope ≪A benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement≫ ≪In respect of an item of income or capital ≫ Impact on conduit and abusive restructuring cases Relation with BEPS Action 7 (splitting of contracts)  

3.5.3 The requirements of the PPT rule Subjective component: ≪One of the principal purposes≫ Objective component: ≪The object and purpose of the relevant provisions≫  

3.5.4 Selected EU law perspective EU primary law EU secondary law (Parent-Subsidiary Directive) Impact on the EU-Swiss amending protocol 

to the Savings Agreement Synthesis  

3.5.5 The PPT rule in practice: the examples in the proposed OECD commentaries In general In conduit arrangements  

3.5.6 The importance of the OECD Commentaries to the PPT rule 


3.6 The consequences of denial of treaty benefits  


3.7 The relation of the PPT rule with treaty SAARs  

3.7.1 The issue: ≪Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement≫  

3.7.2 The interpretation under the proposed OECD commentaries   

3.7.3 Conclusion: treaty SAAR solely applies if it covers the same facts   

3.7.4 The particular case of beneficial ownership Situation under the 2014 OECD Commentary and proposed commentaries What if beneficial ownership is given a broad and objective meaning (Switzerland)? Conclusion: meaning of beneficial ownership must be aligned with 2014 OECD Commentary and BEPS policy  


3.8 Policy outlook and conclusions  


Official Documents  

Autor: Prof. Dr. iur. Robert Danon

Produkt ist ein Teil von:

2017/3 IFF Forum für Steuerrecht

Lic. iur. Heinz Baumgartner
CHF 106.00